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Introduction 
If we were to ever create a perfect theory of mind, one of its central elements must be a 
convincing treatment of subjective experience. The concept of subjective experience is 
deeply problematic in itself: for many types of experiences, it seems impossible to 
convey all their qualitative properties to others. We cannot express the painful 
experience of breaking a bone in words, and no one becomes acquainted with the smell 
of vanilla through vivid descriptions. The trouble of communicating the qualities of 
experiences lies at the root of one of the main problems in the philosophy of mind: a 
complete description of the mind would surely contain a convincing account of 
subjective experiences, and our limited access to these experiences may seem to prevent 
such an account. There are various views on whether a satisfying solution to this 
problem is possible, but it is clear that any plausible theory of mind must address it in 
some way. 
It is possible to roughly divide the viewpoints on the problem of subjective 
experience in two (very broad) groups. In one group, we have the philosophers who 
believe that we are able to give a plausible complete description of the subjective 
elements of experience. This perspective is often based on some version of physicalism 
or functionalism, and its supporters often attempt to characterize subjective experience 
in a way that allows for objective explanation based on psychological and neurological 
research.1 Philosophers in the other group think that this approach to subjective 
experience is inadequate, and that there are at least some qualitative properties of 
experience that cannot be captured in objective terms.2 
Philosophers like John Smart (1959), David Lewis (1966) and David Armstrong 
(1968) belong in the first group. They argue that since developments in natural sciences 
give us a plausible picture of so many phenomena, it is unreasonable to say that the 
mind cannot be properly captured in scientific terms. In an attempt to create an account 
of mental states that is in line with findings from the physical sciences, they started the 
development of a strand of theories of mind that is now known as analytic functionalism.  
Analytic functionalists attempt to create topic-neutral analyses of mental concepts: 
                                                          
1 Examples of this view can be found in  Smart (1959), Lewis (1966 & 1980),  Armstrong (1968 
& 1980), Churchland (1986 & 2002), Harman (1990),  Tye (1994), Dennett (1991 & 2017). 
2 Examples of this view can be found in Broad (1925), Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982), Block 
(1980c, 1990 & 1996), Chalmers (1996 & 2010), Levine (2001). 
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analyses that are neutral about the physical or mental status of concepts.3 This means 
that the descriptions of sensations do not contain terms that require us to accept or 
reject some sort of independent mental aspect of the world. By analyzing common-sense 
mental concepts (such as “feeling pain” or “being hungry”) and determining their 
functional role, analytic functionalists attempt to find a place for folk-psychological 
concepts in a scientific framework. 
There are philosophers who think that functionalist theories are too reductionist, 
and fail to account for the subjective aspects of experience in a proper way. Thomas 
Nagel (1974) argues that since the subjective properties of experience should be the 
central topic of scientific inquiry into the mental, it would make no sense to attempt a 
more objective description by taking the subjective elements out of experience. Frank 
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (1982) supports the view that a complete collection of 
all the physical knowledge would still leave some knowledge out, and this would mean 
that there must be some aspect of experience that analytic functionalism leaves out. 
If we allow the notion that there is some type of irreducible qualitative aspect in 
subjective experience, we open the door for a group of arguments known as inversion 
arguments. Inversion arguments are arguments based on the intuition that even if two 
people are perfectly identical from a functional perspective, their subjective experiences 
could differ. This is usually illustrated with the concept of inverted color-experiences: it 
seems to be possible that when two people are presented with a blue object on the left 
and a yellow object on the right, person A’s qualitative color-experience while looking at 
the left object is identical to person B’s color-experience while looking at the right object 
(and vice versa). This difference would not appear in a functional description of these 
color-experiences, and this supposedly shows that there is some aspect of mental life 
that functionalist theories fail to properly capture.  
While the specific potential failure to capture color-inversion in functional terms 
may be a weakness that the functionalist would be prepared to acknowledge, the 
possibility of this inversion would have deeper implications for functionalist theories. 
The failure to capture subjective differences between color-experiences would 
potentially also pose a problem for other types of experience. While a person’s complete 
                                                          
3 Block, 1980b: 179 
5 
 
functional description could suggest at state of perfect well-being, their actual 
experience may be one of deep pain. The fields of psychology and neuroscience would 
not be able to provide reliable knowledge about subjective experience: the 
characterization of experience used in those fields of research only captures the 
behavioral or functional aspects of the mind, and their claims only capture qualitative 
experience under the assumption that it is tied to those aspects.  
It is clear that if we want a reliable and complete functionalist theory, it must be 
immune to inversion  arguments. I think that inversion arguments result from a 
fundamentally flawed perspective on the qualitative properties of experience, and this 
paper is an attempt to argue for what I think is a more plausible perspective. I will 
defend the thesis that analytic functionalism provides an appropriate framework for a 
plausible and complete analysis of mental states. A defense of this thesis potentially 
requires a rejection of some deep intuitions regarding our subjective experiences, and it 
is therefore unlikely that many of its opponents will suddenly be swayed by this text. But 
despite the problems that affect any text concerning fundamental intuitions, I think that 
it is possible to make a relatively convincing case for the strength of analytic 
functionalism. 
The main text of this paper has four parts. In the first part, I will provide a 
detailed account of analytic functionalism. This will start with a short reflection on the 
behaviorist roots of analytic functionalism, after which I will move on to a description of 
Smart’s (1959) early functionalist theory and Lewis’s (1966) stronger version. I will also 
consider some further developments that Lewis (1980) made, along with some of 
Armstrong’s (1980) reflections on our conscious awareness of mental states. 
The second part will start with a short description of the problems that Nagel 
(1974) and Jackson (1982) presented. While Nagel and Jackson only present somewhat 
general comments on the problems that a functionalist needs to answer for, I think that 
they provide clear examples of the underlying convictions that lead to opposition to 
functionalism. I will then present two versions of inversion arguments. The first version 
is a relatively simple one, which I will  describe based on Shoemaker (1982). The second 
version is the more complicated argument from Inverted Earth, which was presented by 
Block (1990). 
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In the third part, I will propose a potential solution for the problems that 
inversion arguments pose. This solution will rely on accepting Laurence Nemirow 
(1990) and Lewis’s (1999) so-called ability hypothesis, which roughly holds that our 
acquaintance with qualitative aspects of experiences lies in the ability to 
remember/imagine/recognize those qualitative aspects. I will first give a detailed 
explanation of the ability hypothesis, and then briefly show how this answers the 
problems that Nagel and Jackson presented. I will then argue that accepting the ability 
hypothesis gives us a characterization of qualitative experience that enables us to reject 
inversion arguments, and that these arguments can be shown to rely on implausible 
assumptions. Nemirow and Lewis argued that the ability hypothesis provided a 
satisfying answer to the issues that Nagel and Jackson saw. I intend to show that 
accepting the ability hypothesis also gives us a satisfying answer to the issues that the 
inversion arguments by Shoemaker and Block present.  
In the fourth part, I will provide additional reasons for accepting the ability 
hypothesis. I will argue that acceptance of the ability hypothesis opens up the way for an 
account of qualitative experiences that is more plausible than alternatives. Dennett 
(1990) argues that traditional characterizations of qualitative experiences are often 
deeply problematic.  I will show that the ability hypothesis underwrites a notion of 
qualitative experience that is less problematic, and not affected by Dennett’s arguments 
against the traditional notion. I will then use texts by Shoemaker (1975), Quine (1969) 
and Dennett (2017) as a basis to reflect on the notion of similarity of qualitative 
experience, and then argue that there is a role for the ability hypothesis in a plausible 
account of qualitative experience.  
The conclusion of the paper will be that a combination of analytic functionalism 
(AF) and the ability hypothesis (AH) gives us a plausible starting point for a theory of 
mind. I think that AF+AH is less problematic than alternative views, and that arguments 
against it often rely on intuitions that have far more troubling implications themselves. 
While I will not give a definitive proof for the success of AF+AH, I will show that 
combining AF and AH gives us a version of functionalism that is more plausible than 
many potential alternative accounts of the mental. This conclusion addresses 
fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, and it may help towards strengthening 
the position of analytic functionalism. 
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Part I 
An Overview of Analytic Functionalism 
 
The behaviorist roots of functionalism 
For a complete picture of analytic functionalism, it is useful to take a look at its 
behaviorist roots. The term ´behaviorism´ was introduced in 1913 by John B. Watson, 
and referred to the view that the field of psychology should be a “…purely objective 
experimental branch of natural science” that fully characterizes mental processes in 
terms of their behavioral expressions.4 A main element in behaviorism is the view that 
psychological descriptions should not rely on references to ‘inner’ processes of the 
mind.5 Behaviorism holds that the mind is not some mysterious internal substance  that 
affects behavior: mental processes should be identified through their behavioral 
manifestations.6 This view fits well with materialist accounts of the mind: outward 
behavior can be described in physico-chemical terms, meaning that successful  
identification of mental processes with outward behavior would then seem to allow for 
description of mental processes in physico-chemical terms.7 
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Gilbert Ryle presents an account of the mind that 
fits well with behaviorism. Ryle attacks what he calls the ‘official doctrine’: the dualist 
view on the nature of minds that is very popular among both laymen and theorists (e.g. 
philosophers, psychologists, religious teachers).8 He characterizes this view as follows:9 
-Every human being (perhaps with some exceptions, like very young children) 
has both a mind and a body. 
-Mind and body are usually harnessed together, but the mind could exist 
independent of the body. 
                                                          
4 Watson, 1913: 248 
5 Armstrong, 1980: 193 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ryle, 1949: 1 
9 Ibid. 
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-The body exists in space and is subject to mechanical laws. Its behavior is public, 
and can be inspected by observers. 
-The mind does not exist in space, and is not bound by mechanical laws. Direct 
acquaintance with the processes of the mind is private: only the person whose 
mind it is can monitor at least some (and perhaps even all) mental states.  
In Ryle’s own account of the mental, reference to any sort of hidden mental 
substance is avoided. Mental processes are instead seen as an aspect of our behavior.10 
Anger does not cause aggressive behavior, it is the aggressive behavior.11 Thoughts are 
not inner processes that could produce behavior, they are expressions of behavior.12 
Feelings do not mysteriously affect behavior: they are agitations that can be observed in 
our behavior.13  
While mental processes can be identified based on observed behavior, a theory of 
mind should also be able to account for mental processes that do not directly affect our 
behavior. To account for these processes, Ryle uses the notion of dispositions. A 
disposition is the tendency of a thing to behave in a certain way under certain 
circumstances. Ryle uses glass as an example: to say that glass is brittle does not mean 
that it will ever break, it only means that it would easily break if a relatively small 
amount of force were ever applied to it.14 The fact that the glass would break easily does 
not mean that glass is in the state of ‘being brittle’: it only means that it will change to a 
particular state (the state of ‘broken’) under certain circumstances.  
If the notion of dispositions is applied to the mind, it is possible to create an 
account of mental states that do not directly produce behavior. A behaviorist could 
argue that although a person did not behave in a certain way, that person was disposed 
to behave in a certain way.15 A person can be said to be angry without showing any signs 
of anger, if we know that there are specific events or circumstances that would suddenly 
result in them showing angry behavior.16 The fact that the angry behavior was not 
                                                          
10 Armstrong, 1980: 193 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ryle, 1949: 91 
14 Ibid., p. 32 
15 Armstrong, 1980: 194 
16 Ibid. 
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actually produced does not lead the behaviorist to the conclusion that the person is not 
angry: the possibility of angry behavior is acknowledged, so there is still room for 
mental states that are not directly accompanied by actualized behavior.17 
While the introduction of dispositions allows the behaviorist to acknowledge 
unobservable mental states, it does not open up the way for a complete behaviorist 
theory of mind. A science fiction example created by Hilary Putnam shows us that a 
behaviorist notion of mental states is simply too limited.18 Putnam asks us to imagine a 
community where all the adults are able to successfully suppress all involuntary pain-
behavior. They feel pain just like we do, but they have learned to hide the accompanying 
behavior for ideological reasons. They do not even speak about pain, as that would 
disgrace their family.19 
If the community described in Putnam’s example would indeed exist, then a 
behaviorist theory would fail to describe the mental aspects of its adult members. The 
behavior of the members would likely lead us to think that the members feel no pain. 
And even if a behaviorist would say that the members could still feel pain, their theory 
would not be able to determine whether they actually do feel pain or not. Since a 
complete theory of mind would have to account for all significant aspects of mental life, 
behaviorism’s failure to determine the presence of fundamental mental processes (like 
pain) is a clear weakness.  
While behaviorism can address some of the problems in the official doctrine, 
Putnam’s scenario shows that a behaviorist analysis of the mental is too limited for a 
complete description of the mind. Even so, the promising parts of behaviorism play a 
role in the development of the type of functionalism that I will defend. Smart, Lewis, and 
Armstrong consider themselves descendants of behaviorists,20 and I will now give an 
overview of the central points in their theories. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 Putnam, 1980: 29 
19 Ibid, p. 30 
20 Block, 1980a: 175 
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Functionalism and the Identity Theory 
When Smart (1959) laid the foundations for his version of functionalism, he did so for 
reasons of parsimony and simplicity.21 Science suggests that organisms consist of 
nothing more that complex arrangements of physical constituents, and that future 
developments may allow us to describe behavior in fully mechanistic terms.22 Non-
physical sensations would be what Smart calls nomological danglers: things that fall 
outside the normal laws and explanations, and seem to occur according  to some specific 
independent law.23 It may seem possible that scientific developments will provide new 
laws to account for these nomological danglers, but this is very unlikely.24 While the 
future will surely bring new discoveries of laws, these laws will likely describe very 
simple constituents. New laws that would describe processes consisting of billions of 
neurons would be unlike any other laws in science, and Smart is cautious of any 
argument that would rely on the existence of this complicated type of law.25 
Smart argues that sensations are simply brain-processes. He defends the thesis 
that “…in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in 
fact a brain process.”26 This does not mean that we can translate sensation statements to 
brain-process statements, or that they have the same logic as brain-process 
statements.27 Smart says that sensations are brain-processes in the strict sense of 
identity: sensations are not only spatially or temporally continuous with brain-
processes, they are the same four-dimensional object as the brain-process.28 The 
hypothesis that experiences or sensations are the same as physical brain-processes is 
the basis for the so-called identity theory.  
There are various objections to the idea that sensations statements refer to 
processes of the brain. The first issue that Smart addresses is that a person without any 
knowledge about brain-processes is still capable of reporting on their sensations.29 
                                                          
21 Smart, 1959: 141, 155 
22 Ibid., p. 143 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid., p. 145 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 146 
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Their sensation statements seemingly cannot refer to brain-processes, as the person 
would then refer to something that they know nothing about. Smart says that this is not 
actually a problem, because we can say something about A even if we do not  know that 
“A is identical with B”.30 It can be said that a person reports on a brain-process if they 
say “I see a blue sky”, even if the person has no idea that they are reporting on a brain-
process. 
 Another issue is that sensations such as seeing color may seem to have qualities 
that are over and above the physical aspects of brain-processes.31 Smart illustrates his 
solution to this problem by focusing on the concept of a secondary quality such as color. 
In Smart’s view on color,  a statement such as “This object is red” roughly means that a 
normal percipient would easily be able to pick the object out of a group of green things 
but not out of a group of red things.32 This is usually possible thanks to the ability to 
perceive the color red, but a colorblind person would also be able to make this 
statement (for example, by relying on other people who tell them that the object is 
red).33 This account of color suggests that color is an unimportant quality for physics, as 
the ability (or inability) of a complex neurophysiological mechanism to discriminate 
colors is unlikely to correspond to simple distinctions in nature.34 This means that our 
color-sensations are not the result of exposure to some sort of intrinsic quality in nature.  
 Smart suggests that when a person says “I see a yellowish-orange after-image”, 
this statement should be interpreted as something like: “There is something going on 
which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange 
illuminated in front of me, that is, when I really see an orange.” (Smart, 1959: 149). An 
important thing that Smart notes is that the sentence “There is something going on which 
is like what is going on when…” only contains topic-neutral words: there are no 
implications regarding the mental or physical status of the described experience.35 This 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 147 
31 Ibid., p. 148 
32 Ibid., p. 149 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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partial sentence allows for descriptions that are neutral between dualism and 
materialism, as it only makes a claim about the similarity between two experiences.36  
A stronger argument for functionalism 
While Smart’s claims support the widely held view that there is a strong relationship 
between sensations and physical processes, he has not found a definitive proof of this 
relation. He has only shown that it seems highly likely that sensations are physical 
processes, not that they must necessarily be so in the metaphysical sense. Saul Kripke 
says that in order for the identity theory to be proven, it must be shown that it is 
impossible to imagine that a specific sensation (or lack of sensation) does not correlate 
with a specific brain-process(or lack thereof).37 Kripke compares statements regarding 
the identity of mind and body with statements like “Heat is the motion of molecules.” 
Heat and the motion of molecules are necessarily identical. It is simply impossible to 
imagine that heat and the motion of molecules are different things: any attempt to 
imagine this would rely on incorrectly using one of the designators (or both) to 
designate something different than the thing that it in fact designates. Kripke illustrates 
this with the example of trying to imagine that the table in front of you might have been 
made of ice: this seems possible, but we are actually imagining a different table (made of 
ice) in the position of the actual table.38 
If we want a definitive proof of the identity theory, it must be shown that the 
relation between mental events and physical events is the same as the relation between 
heat and the motion of molecules. David Lewis argues for the existence of this type of 
relation between mental events and physical events in ‘An Argument for the Identity 
Theory’ (1966). He sees the causal role of an experience as its definitive characteristic, 
and since these causal roles (according to him) necessarily belong to certain physical 
states, the physical states possess the definitive characteristics of the experience and are 
therefore identical with it.39  
 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Kripke, 1980: 144  
38 Ibid. 
39 Lewis, 1966: 17 
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Lewis illustrates his argument by comparing experiences with cylindrical 
combination locks for bicycle chains. The definitive characteristic of their state of being 
unlocked is its causal state: setting the combination is the cause of the unlocking, and 
doing so has the effect of putting the lock in a state where it will open when gently 
pulled.40 Knowing this allows us to determine whether the lock is in the state of locked 
or the state of unlocked. But the states of being locked or unlocked are  also certain 
physical states: the alignment of slotted discs in the lock has the causal role of being 
unlocked, as the slotted discs need to be put in a specific configuration in order for the 
lock to be unlocked. Therefore the causal state of being unlocked is identical with the 
physical state of being unlocked.41 Lewis thinks that the same reasoning can also be 
applied to experiences. 
There is a difference between an experience and the attribute of having that 
experience. The state itself is the state that occupies a certain definitive causal role, 
while the attribute of having that experience is the attribute of being in that state.42 This 
distinction allows Lewis to refute the following objection:43   
 -Attributes are only identical if they are predicated by synonymous 
expressions. 
-Experience-ascriptions are never synonymous with neural-state-
descriptions. 
-Therefore, experience-ascriptions and neural-state-descriptions are 
never identical. 
The distinction between the experience itself and the attribute of having that experience 
shows that this objection fails. The objection only shows that there is a difference 
between ascribing an experience to someone and describing their neural state, which 
Lewis agrees with.44 It does not show that experiences and neural states are different, so 
we can still hold on to this view.45 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 18 
42 Ibid., p. 19 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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  Lewis says that the definitive causal role of any experience is “…expressible by a 
finite set of conditions that specify its typical causes and its typical effects under various 
circumstances.”46 While Lewis’s description of experiences does not fit in behaviorism 
(as thorough behaviorist analyses deny this characterization of mental states, including 
experiences), the principle that experiences are defined by their causal roles is based on 
the behaviorist view that there is a necessary connection between an experience and its 
occasions and manifestations.47  
A big difference between behaviorism and Lewis’s theory is that Lewis’s holds 
that experiences are something real: in his account, experiences are the “effects of their 
occasions and the causes of their manifestations”.48 A second difference between Lewis’s 
theory and behaviorism is that Lewis claims that an experience can be caused by other 
experiences, and can cause other experiences itself.49 This aspect of his theory is 
important, because it is required if we want to say that experiences are accessible 
through introspection: if we say that experience y is the experience of reflecting on 
experience x, then experience x must be such that it somehow is a causal factor for 
experience y. If there is nothing in experience x that allows the potential causing of other 
experiences, we would not be able to have the experience of reflecting on experience x.  
A third difference is that in Lewis’s theory, it is not the case that all causes and 
effects of all occurrences of the experiences are relevant in defining the experience.50 It 
is acceptable to only use the causes and effects that typically determine the experience 
in order to define the experience, and exceptional cases where typical causes or effects 
are absent (or present while they typically are not) are not problematic.51 Since 
behaviorism does not acknowledge the existence of an experience apart from its 
occasions and manifestations, a behaviorist definition cannot focus on typical causes or 
effects and instead has to be very complex (as there is no “typical occurrence” of an 
experience to fall back on).52 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p. 21 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 22 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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Lewis thinks that while nonphysical phenomena may coexist with physical 
phenomena (ranging from perfectly correlating with them to being unrelated to them), 
they cannot have any causal power towards physical phenomena.53 Since the behavioral 
manifestations of experiences always involve physical phenomena, they cannot be the 
result of something that is nonphysical.54 Because these behavioral manifestations are 
among the typical effects that definitively belong to an experience, the experience 
cannot be the result of something that is not physical.55 And even though it is not 
positively established that neural states are the definitive causal roles of experiences, 
there does not seem to be any other physical phenomena that could plausibly fit the 
role.56 
How to account for unusual mental states 
Even if we would accept the plausibility of Lewis’s theory, there may be some instances 
of mental states that are more problematic. Lewis (1980) presents two problematic 
types of pain that may occur. The first is what he calls mad pain: a feeling of pain that is 
just like our usual notion of pain, but connected to unusual causes and unusual effects.57  
The second type is what he calls Martian pain: pain with causes and effects that are 
similar to those in the case of the average human being, while the physical instantiation 
has significant differences.  
The two unusual cases must have a place in a good theory of mind. An identity 
theory that focuses purely on physical configuration can provide a proper description of 
mad pain: we could say that the madman is in pain because his brain is in a state of 
feeling pain, even though that brain state was reached by unusual causes and causes 
unusual effects.58 But while such a theory could describe the pain of the madman, it 
would fail to capture the pain of the Martian: the Martian’s feeling of pain would not be 
recognized by a theory that identifies pain with the usual human brain-configuration 
during pain. 
                                                          
53 Ibid., p. 24 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Lewis, 1980: 216 
58 Ibid., p. 217 
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A functionalist or behaviorist theory of mind could describe the pain of the 
Martian.59 Since his pain has similar causes and similar effects to ours, the functionalist 
or behaviorist could say that all the relevant factors point towards the conclusion that 
the Martian does indeed have pain. But this theory would not be able to capture the pain 
of the madman: his feeling of pain is not related to any usual causes, and does not have 
the usual effects.60 
Lewis thinks that the theories that he and Armstrong (1968) have proposed are 
able to account for both mad pain and Martian pain.61 This is because he and Armstrong 
understand the concept of pain to be a nonrigid concept.62 What this means is that while 
the concept of pain usually applies to a specific type of neural state, it could also have 
been applied to some other physical state if that state had a similar causal role.63 The 
fact that we are in pain during certain neural states is contingent: the concept of pain 
could be applicable in many other possible cases, it just happens to apply to normal 
humans during a certain type of neural state.64  
By saying that pain is some state that occupies a causal role for a population, we 
can account for both normal humans and Martians by saying that pain has the same 
causal role in both populations.65 Pain is [a certain pattern of neurons firing] for the 
population of humans, and [the inflation of certain cavities] for the population of 
Martians.66 But this physical difference is not problematic, as we can still say that the 
two different physical states embody the same causal state. 
 Lewis addresses the madman by saying that his theory allows for exceptional 
cases.67 We have seen earlier that his theory holds for cases with typical causes and 
effects, and he repeats that statement.68 The madman and his fellow madmen are the 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., p. 218 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Lewis notes that this does not mean that the concept of pain and our neural state of pain are 
contingently identical (1980: 218). It is contingently true that pain is a certain neural state, but it 
is necessary that pain is identical with itself and therefore also identical with the certain neural 
state. 
65 Lewis, 1966: 219. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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exceptional cases where the typical causes and effects do not apply. But they are still 
part of the human population.69 Lewis say that we can still say that the madman is in 
pain, because he is in the same state as the others in his population when they are in 
pain.70  
Awareness of mental states 
A potential weakness for functionalist theories may be that they do not provide a clear 
role for our first-person awareness of our mental states. While functionalism may give 
us a satisfactory explanation of the behavior of others, it may not seem to  account for 
everything that seems to be going on in our mind. In ‘The Nature of Mind’ (1980), 
Armstrong illustrates this with the example of automatism that may occur when people 
drive a car for a long time without a break: it is possible to drive a car for a long distance, 
and then suddenly realize that you have driven a long period without being aware of 
what you were doing. Clearly there must have been some  unconscious mental processes 
going on; the car would have crashed otherwise.71 But the mental activity during the 
ride was different than the mental activity that we have while consciously driving a car, 
as we are aware of our actions in the latter case.72 The difference between conscious 
awareness and unconscious awareness seems significant in a description of the mind, so 
we must pay some attention to it.  
Armstrong thinks that the problem of describing consciousness can be solved by 
defining consciousness (in the sense used in the driving-example) as “…perception or 
awareness of the state of our own mind.”73 We could then say that the driver in the 
automatic state is aware of the road, but not aware of his awareness of the road.74 If this 
account is right, inner observation can be seen as similar to perception. Consciousness 
can be seen as awareness of inner states, similar to how perception is awareness of 
outer states.75 Awareness of thoughts or emotions comes with the capacity to 
discriminate between different mental states.76 This capacity can be expressed with 
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words, but expressions are only results of the inner state and not the inner state itself.77 
If we regard consciousness to be awareness of inner states, we can capture it in 
functional terms: a state of consciousness can be seen as a causal state, and therefore fits 
into Lewis and Armstrong’s functionalist accounts of the mental. 
 
 
Part II 
Problems for Analytic Functionalism 
 
Potential issues for description of subjective experience 
A main reason for the attractiveness of functionalism is that it enables us to make many 
objectives statements about mental states, regarding both our own mental states and 
those of others. But the broad scope of functional statements may lead to doubts about 
whether these statements can provide an exhaustive account of all the relevant features 
of the mind. In ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ (1974), Nagel argues that reductionist 
theories like those of Armstrong (1968) and Lewis (1966) completely fail to  adequately 
address the relation between the body and consciousness. Nagel says that if a creature 
has consciousness, then  there must be something that it is like to be that creature.78 This 
‘what it is like’-aspect of consciousness is what he calls the subjective character of 
experience.79 He thinks that this aspect is not analyzable in functional or causal terms, 
because he thinks that an analysis of this type would be logically compatible with the 
absence of subjective experience.80 
Nagel gives a description of how objective descriptions are achieved in science. 
Many phenomena can be described from many points of view and through different 
perceptual systems.81 A reductive explanation of experience is problematic, because our 
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subjective viewpoint is precisely what we wish to describe.82 Nagel says that our  
subjective viewpoint of what it is like to experience a thing is the most comprehensible, 
and a more objective description would be from a viewpoint that is actually farther 
away from the real nature of the phenomena of experience.83 
A more focused version of Nagel’s problem can be found in Jackson’s Knowledge 
Argument. We have to imagine a brilliant scientist named Mary, who has always been 
locked in a black and white room and has to investigate the world from a black and 
white television.84 This television provides her with every possible piece of physical 
information about the neurophysiology of vision: how the wave-length of light affects 
the retina, what goes on in the brain when we see certain colors, when and how our 
central nervous system produces sentences such as ‘The sky is blue’, etcetera.85 It is 
plausible that all physical information could be received in this way. But if Mary ever 
leaves the room, it seems obvious that she will learn something new about visual 
experience when she is confronted with actual colors.86 While she supposedly had all the 
physical information, she still obtained new information, implying that physical 
information is not all the information that there is.87 We can see that Jackson holds the 
view that knowing what some experience is like is propositional knowledge, and that the 
only way to obtain this propositional knowledge is by having a certain experience. 
 The knowledge argument is a potential problem for analytic functionalism. It 
shows that our ability to talk about the mental states of others may not be that strong at 
all: we can regard color-experience as the result of some observation and as a causal 
element for various behaviors,  but we may not be able to produce an exhaustive 
account of color-experience. Intuitively, there seems to be a difference between people 
who have had an experience and people who are only familiar with that experience 
through knowledge of its causes and effects. 
 
                                                          
82 Ibid., p. 175 
83 Ibid.  
84 Jackson, 1982: 130 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
20 
 
Nagel and Jackson show some problems that functionalists need to address, but 
there may be an even more fundamental problem for functionalism. Nagel says that 
there is a sense in which we can say objective things about the experiences of other 
people, as long as our own point of view is similar enough.88 Jackson seems to have a 
similar view: the Knowledge Argument is intended to show that Mary lacks certain 
knowledge of color-experience, but the circumstances under which she would gain this 
knowledge are clear. Their arguments do not account for the fact that knowledge of 
subjective experiences may be far more limited than they assume, and that our 
experiences may be far less similar (or completely different) to those of others (or our 
own at some other time) than we assume. This implication of the divide between 
subjective and objective knowledge can be illustrated with a look at the implications of 
inversion arguments. 
Inversion Arguments 
Before I turn to Shoemaker (1982) and Block’s (1990) treatments of inversion 
arguments, I will first give a more general account of inversion arguments and the 
problems that they potentially pose. In a certain sense, it seems likely that the way that 
colors look is more or less the same between different people. Imagine looking at a blue 
sky, together with another person. From the way we usually discuss colors, it may seem 
obvious that you both see the same color (assuming that you both have relatively 
normal functioning optical systems). You assume that the other person’s qualitative 
blue-experience is similar to yours, and we would be confused if they would suddenly 
genuinely say something like “the sky is bright yellow today”.  
While color-descriptions usually do not pose practical issues, it seems possible to 
intuitively imagine a sense in which the other person could see a completely different 
color. The fact that both you and the other person refer to the sky as ‘blue’ is only 
because you have both learned to refer to the color of the sky (and all things with a color 
similar to it) with the word ‘blue’. The idea that the other person has the same color 
experiences as us may seem obvious because they use the same words to refer to these 
experiences as we do, but this actually only shows a non-qualitative similarity between 
you and the other person. When you use the words ‘blue’ and ‘yellow’, you associate 
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these with your color-experiences of seeing blue and yellow. But what if these 
experiences are swapped for the other person? The color-experience that they have 
when looking at a blue sky could be the same color-experience that you have when you 
look at a lemon, and vice versa. The fact that we use the same language cannot solve the 
issue: the words that we use do not refer to our personal color-perception, but only to 
the sense in which color-perceptions are similar to all of us with average color-
perception. 
The thought that color-experiences can be inverted is often presented in the form 
of spectrum-inversion:  the idea that there is a color spectrum that can be inversed (or 
perhaps shifted in some other way) between different people. If spectrum inversion is 
conceivable, it opens up the way for inversion arguments against functionalism.89 A 
simple standard inversion argument looks something like this: 
-If spectrum inversion is conceivable, even the most detailed functional 
description of the mind cannot reliably tell us what kind of qualitative color-
experience the subject has. 
-Qualitative color-experiences are a significant aspect of our mind. 
-Conclusion: If spectrum inversion is conceivable, functionalist theories are 
unable to provide a complete description of the mind. 
While I think that analytic functionalism combined with the ability hypothesis 
will give us a plausible theory of mind, the potential conceivability of spectrum inversion 
would indeed be a significant obstacle. This means that in order to defend analytic 
functionalism, it must be shown that a plausible functionalist theory can treat the 
concepts involved in inversion arguments in such a way that spectrum inversion 
becomes inconceivable or at least highly implausible. I will now give a more detailed 
account of two inversion arguments and the concepts that are involved in them, based 
on texts by Shoemaker and Block. 
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Shoemaker’s treatment of spectrum inversion 
One of the distinctions that Shoemaker illustrates in ‘The Inverted Spectrum’ (1982) is 
the distinction between intrasubjective and intersubjective spectrum inversion. 
Intrasubjective inversion refers to a systematic difference between a person’s color-
experience at a certain time and that same person’s color-experience at a different 
time.90 Intersubjective inversion refers to a systematic difference between the color-
experiences of two different people when presented with the same external color-
information.91 The potential conceivability of intrasubjective inversion does not imply 
the conceivability of intersubjective inversion, but Shoemaker thinks that the 
conceivability of the former (if it is indeed conceivable) can possibly be used to argue for 
the plausibility of conceivability of the latter.92  
For his argument, Shoemaker first argues that it seems plausible that 
intrasubjective inversion is possible.93 Based on a passage from Wittgenstein’s lecture 
notes (1968), Shoemaker argues that we can easily imagine how we could verify a 
change in a person’s color-experience.94 Wittgenstein gives the example of a person who 
says that their color-experience of red and blue have somehow switched.95 The person 
says that glowing coals look cold, while the clear sky looks warm. Wittgenstein thinks 
that we would be inclined to say that the color-experiences were indeed switched.96 
Shoemaker agrees, and thinks that we could empirically determine whether the person 
has actually undergone this inversion.97  
In Wittgenstein’s example, we can determine that the person’s qualitative 
experience is different because it can be empirically tested: we can confront the person 
with various colored objects and ask whether their color-experience is different than it 
was before. But if the other person has had different color-experiences as us from birth 
(or somehow forgot about his earlier color-experiences), we would not be able to tell 
that something was different between ourselves and the other person. If intrasubjective 
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spectrum inversion is conceivable, it could lead to great skepticism about other minds: if 
the behavior of others does not tell us anything about their qualitative experiences, we 
may never know they are actually experiencing.98 But Shoemaker thinks that the 
problem can be solved. To understand why, it is useful to first look at his distinction 
between intentional and qualitative content. 
Shoemaker distinguishes between an object’s intentional content and its 
qualitative content. He make this distinction in the context of a person who has 
undergone intrasubjective spectrum inversion, but has eventually accommodated to the 
change in his experience.99 This person sees yellow in instances where he would 
previously see blue, but has made an effort to change his vocabulary: he now uses the 
term ‘blue’ to refer to the color of the sky, even though the color that he sees is the one 
that he would have referred to as ‘yellow’ before his spectrum inversion.100  
The spectrum inversion has not changed the intentional content of the person’s 
experience: the external color-information that he is confronted with remains the same, 
and he has learned to use the same words to refer to it as he did before.101 But there has 
occurred a change in the qualitative aspect of his color-experiences: the color-
experience that he has when looking at ‘the blue sky’ has a different qualitative aspect 
than before his inversion.102 In that sense, his color-experience when presented with 
blue is the one that he previously would have had when presented with yellow. But 
while we can say that our descriptions of experiences refer to the intentional content of 
the experience, this still leaves problems for the qualitative aspect of experience. Even if 
your intentional content and behavior regarding some phenomenon is similar to other 
people, there may still be a radical difference between your qualitative experience and 
that of others.103  
Shoemaker reflects on what he calls the Frege-Schlick view on qualia. Frege’s 
(1956) view is that references to one’s qualitative experience are only meaningful to the 
experiencer. Schlick’s view is that we can only make meaningless statements about the 
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qualitative similarity of the experience of two subjects, as we cannot properly refer to 
these experiences.104 Shoemaker says that if the Frege-Schlick view holds, it is 
unproblematic to talk about the similarity of our experiences and those of others.105 This 
is because the F-S view holds that our descriptions only refer to the intentional content 
of experiences, and that comparisons between our experience and that of others 
therefore only involve the intentional content.  Qualitative similarities affect one’s 
behavior, and the beliefs of the person towards experiences.106 But since the relations 
between a qualitative state and behavior do not hold intersubjectively, intersubjective 
inversion is not a relevant problem: it simply makes no sense to talk about the 
qualitative similarity between your qualitative experience and that of others.107 
Shoemaker thinks that qualia (which he defines as “…features of sensory states in 
virtue of which they stand to one another in relationships of qualitative similarity and 
difference”) can be defined in functional terms, by giving a functionalist account of what 
it means for qualia to be qualitatively similar.108 A functionalist description would have 
to be that if qualia Q1 and Q2 are similar (to a certain degree), then the experience of Q1 
and Q2 in a person will both have similar effects on the person’s beliefs and behavior.109 
Two people can have similar qualia, though these may not cause a similar qualitative 
experience for these people: it only means that both qualia would cause a similar 
qualitative experience if they were to be instantiated in one of the people.110 But while 
the qualitative experience that the similar qualia cause may be different for two people, 
the physical/functional instantiation of the qualia will be similar for both people.111 
I think that there is a problem in Shoemaker’s treatment of qualia and spectrum 
inversion. It is unclear to me how Shoemaker’s characterization of qualia is helpful in the 
discussion about spectrum inversion. The problem that qualia originally presented for 
functionalist descriptions of mental states was that the same functionalist description of 
a mental state could potentially apply to multiple qualitatively different states. These 
states would appear identical from a purely functional description, and the fact that they 
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contained different qualia (or no qualia at all) was a significant factor that the functional 
description missed. If we focus on the supposed physical/functional instantiation of 
qualia, we are missing the problem that the usual conception of qualia presents. 
Shoemaker presents a conception of qualia that may be captured in functional terms, but 
inversion arguments seem to involve a conception of qualia that evades Shoemaker’s 
treatment. We can say that qualia Q1 and Q2 are similar if they have similar effects on a 
subject’s beliefs and behavior, but inversion arguments hold that two different qualia 
could have the same relations to a subject’s beliefs and behavior. If we want to attack 
inversion arguments, we need to show why this is implausible.  
Block’s Inverted Earth 
Block has proposed a unique version of spectrum inversion. He wants us to imagine an 
alternative version of Earth: Inverted Earth. Inverted Earth is exactly the same as our 
Earth, except for two things: everything on Inverted Earth has the complementary color 
of its color on Earth, and the hue-related vocabulary of Inverted Earth’s citizens is 
inverted.112 The grass on Inverted Earth is red, yet its residents would truthfully answer 
“green” when asked about the color of grass. We cannot say that one of the two Earths 
has the ‘correct’ terms for colors, in the same way that we cannot say that the English 
term “blue” is more or less correct than the French term “bleu”. Inverted Earth residents 
are not incorrect when they say that “grass is green”, as their use of the word “green” 
refers to the color that we refer to with the word “red”.  The difference between the 
usual inverted spectrum hypothesis and the Inverted Earth-scenario lies in the fact that 
the former is an attempt to show the conceivability of qualitative differences in cases 
with identical intentional content and functional descriptions. The Inverted Earth 
example will supposedly show the possibility of identical qualitative experiences in the 
case of different intentional content and functional descriptions.113  
Block lets us imagine that we are knocked out by a mad scientist, who then puts 
color inversion lenses in our eyes and transports us to Inverted Earth.114 When you 
wake up, there is no reason to suppose that you are on Inverted Earth at all. Your 
situation on Inverted Earth seems exactly the same as on Earth, because the lenses 
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prevent you from seeing that the world around you is a different color than the world 
you know. This means that the qualitative content of your experience is identical to the 
one you would have had on Earth.115 
According to Block, your intentional content on Inverted Earth is more 
problematic. Block thinks that your beliefs about intentional contents remain the same 
upon arriving at Inverted Earth.116 Since all your color concepts are based on 
experiences on Earth, your claim that “grass is green” would be wrong on Inverted 
Earth: your conception of green is based on the color of grass on normal Earth, and grass 
is not that color on Inverted Earth. Your statement that “The sky is as blue as ever” 
would be incorrect, as the sky that you see on Inverted Earth is yellow and not blue. 
Your statement cannot refer to the color of the sky, as your lenses prevent you from 
seeing the actual color of the sky. This means that the intentional content of your 
experience does not correspond with the color of the sky of Inverted Earth. After a long 
time, your color-terms may come to refer to the colors on Inverted Earth. Once this has 
happened, your functional structure has changed: the effects that blue and yellow things 
have on your functional state have swapped.117 
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Part III 
A Potential Solution for the Problem of Spectrum Inversion 
 
The ability hypothesis 
Before I turn to proposing a solution for inversion problems with help of the ability 
hypothesis, I will first present the ability hypothesis in the context of the arguments that 
Nagel and Jackson presented. In ‘Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance’ 
(1990), Nemirow addresses a difficulty for physicalist theories of mind. Some 
philosophers  (e.g. Feigl 1967, Nagel 1974) argue that physical information is objective, 
while sensory information is subjective. Feigl argues that sensory information is not 
knowledge. He says that a blind person does not lack knowledge about supposed 
qualities of sight, but only the knowledge that can be obtained through sight.118 Feigl 
thinks that the knowledge that we obtain by sight does not necessarily have to be 
obtained through sight, and that it can also be obtained through other forms of 
observing. Nemirow thinks that Feigl underestimates the problem, because a blind 
person could not know what it is like to see.119 Knowledge of experience can only be 
obtained through having the experience, and words such as “knowing”, “discovering”, 
and “remembering” are usually also used for the type of knowledge that we gain through 
experience.120 
While Nemirow agrees with Nagel and Jackson’s opposition towards Feigl, he 
thinks that their own accounts of the cognitive role of acquaintance are flawed.121 He 
says that the knowledge argument only works if we assume that knowledge of what 
something is like must be knowledge of the way things are.122 This assumption would 
allow us to say that since knowing what something is like is not based on physical 
theorizing, information about what something is like is not part of physical science.123 
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But the assumption is problematic, because our vocabulary regarding knowledge also 
applies to abilities.124  
There seems to be a correlation between knowing what something is like and 
knowing how to imagine it, which also fits well with Nagel’s claims.125 We cannot say 
that we can imagine what something is like, and at the same time not know what it 
would be like to experience the thing.126 This strong correlation leads Nemirow to 
suggest what he calls the ability equation: knowing what it is like to have a certain 
experience is identical to knowing how to successfully imagine having that 
experience.127  
The ability equation can be used to answer many problems. It would refute the 
knowledge argument, as it would show the falsity of the proposition that knowing what 
something is like is propositional knowledge.128 It would also explain why it is 
appropriate to use vocabulary regarding knowledge (words such as  “knowing” and 
discovering) when we talk about what an experience is like.129 A third solution that it 
provides is the fact that we would not have to attribute subjectivity to certain 
experiences: failure to know what something is like is simply the lack of ability to 
imagine it, and there is no need to attribute some intrinsic subjectivity to those who do 
have the ability.130 A fourth problem where it would help is the inexpressibility of 
knowing what something is like: instead of saying that experiences have inexpressible 
qualities (as opponents of physicalism would do), it allows us to say that knowing what 
something is like is only linguistically inexpressible because it is an ability.131  
Even though replacing the concept of inexpressible qualities with linguistically 
inexpressible knowledge helps physicalism, physicalists still have to show why the ‘what 
it is like’-knowledge is inexpressible.132 Nemirow answers this using the example of 
color. The ability to imagine a color can only be communicated to someone who has the 
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ability to perform an action by which they can visualize the color.133 Usually only the 
following three actions are suitable: directly visualizing the color, remembering the 
visual experience of the color, or visualizing or remembering similar colors and 
interpolating.134 When someone is able to perform one of these actions, we can instruct 
them to perform the other actions.135 When someone is not able to perform any of these 
actions, we simply cannot tell them what seeing the intended color is like.136  
An obstacle for the ability equation is the intuition that imagination grants direct 
access to universals.137 What this intuition means is that our ability to visualize a certain 
color (such as red) may seem to be the ability to access some sort of ‘raw redness that is 
an of intrinsic part of the world. Nemirow says that this is actually not the case: the 
ability of visualizing red is the ability to represent the particular perceptions of the color 
red.138 Successful visualization allows us to compare colors and make statements about 
other colors. For example: when you witness a color x, you can imagine a darker shade y 
of that color and say “the color that I am witnessing now has a lighter shade than y”.139 
 The imagining of a color has the same functional role as actually seeing the color, 
allowing us to make propositional statements about our imagined color in the same way 
that we do when actually presented with the color.140 The same can be applied to the 
notion of pain: Nemirow gives the example of avoiding the dentist because we imagine 
that the pain that a dentist will inflict outweighs the benefits of the visit.141 Our imagined 
pain functionally represents the expected actual pain in the future, and allows us to 
reason as if we were having the imagined experience.142 Because we are able to use our 
imagination so effectively  in our reasoning about actual experiences, it may seem that 
the imagined concepts (like color and pain) are actually universals with subjective 
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qualities.143 But this intuition is incorrect, as our successful imagining does not allow us 
to infer that we have direct access to the essential qualities of the experiences.144 
Lewis (1999) further defends the ability equation, or as he presents it, the ability 
hypothesis. The ability hypothesis is very similar to Nemirow’s ability equation, and 
Lewis endorses his view.145 His own formulation is as follows: “The Ability Hypothesis 
says that knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of the abilities to 
remember, imagine, and recognize.”146 He uses the term hypothesis because it is 
presented as a more plausible alternative to a different hypothesis: the Hypothesis of 
Phenomenal Information. The Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information holds that there is 
such a thing as phenomenal information: nonphysical and irreducible information 
involved in an experience, that enables us to know what it is like to have that 
experience.147 Acceptance of the ability hypothesis would imply rejection of the 
Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information: if we see the qualitative aspect of an experience 
as the ability to remember/imagine/recognize that experience, the supposedly 
irreducible information is simply information that can only be accessed by those who 
have had the experience. It is simply information that is accessed in a specific way, but 
the information itself is not of a completely different type. 
How the ability hypothesis could solve the spectrum inversion problem 
Nemirow and Lewis argue that the ability hypothesis can be used to refute the 
knowledge argument. I think that if we were to accept the ability hypothesis, it would 
also be possible to refute inversion arguments and thereby strengthen the position of 
analytic functionalism. I will reflect on the described types of inversion arguments, and 
show how they can be accounted for if we keep the ability hypothesis in mind. The first 
type is the standard type, wherein it is supposedly shown that multiple different 
qualitative states may underlie the same functional description. The second type is the 
type that Block described, where it is supposedly shown that a single qualitative state 
can be described by different functional descriptions. 
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In order to reply to inversion arguments using the ability hypothesis, it is helpful 
to present the problem that spectrum inversion poses in terms of abilities. Suppose that 
the ability hypothesis is correct, and that we should see acquaintance with qualitative 
experiences as the ability to remember/imagine/recognize these experiences. This is 
compatible with intrasubjective spectrum inversion: we could recognize that the 
experience that we have when we look at the sky now has different qualitative 
properties as the one that we had before our intrasubjective spectrum inversion.148  
 The problem with intrasubjective spectrum inversion is not that it directly 
clashes with the ability hypothesis, it is that it goes against deep intuitions about our 
acquaintance with many types of qualitative experiences. For suppose that we should 
indeed account for the possibility that we may someday wake up and see the world 
around us in completely different colors. If this were so, our ability to make claims about 
future experiences would be limited: while the qualitative color-experiences that we 
have had while looking at lemons may have been very similar throughout our life up 
until now, we may have a whole other qualitative color-experience when we look at a 
lemon tomorrow. This means that the possibility of intrasubjective spectrum inversion 
may not only lead to skepticism about other minds, but also about our own mind: if we 
must account for the possibility of intrasubjective spectrum inversion, our previous and 
current color-experiences cannot help us predict what kind of qualitative color-
experiences we will have when looking at familiar objects in the future. But this goes 
against our intuition that we are able to make those predictions, and past successes give 
us reason to think that we do indeed have that ability.   
 The unintuitive nature of intrasubjective spectrum inversion becomes more clear 
when we reflect on the link between qualitative aspects of experiences and other 
aspects of experience. When we reflect on some qualitative experience, it seems intuitive 
to think that this qualitative experience is somehow linked to a certain (or several) more 
objectively defined event(s). Even if the pain that we expect to experience during a visit 
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to the dentist is something that cannot be properly described in words, we seem to be 
quite confident in our ability to determine when that type of qualitative experience will 
occur. Perhaps the pain will be worse or less bad than we expected, but we are often 
able to predict what general type of qualitative experience comes along with some event. 
And we are also quite confident in our ability to predict whether other experiences will 
be painful, even if they are different from experiences that we have had up until now: I 
have never broken a finger, yet I am confident about the fact that this would probably be 
an at least somewhat painful experience. We can see that our abilities to predict 
qualitative experiences play a crucial role in our behavior and expectations, and the 
ability hypothesis fits well with that intuition. The idea of potential spectrum inversion 
goes against our intuitions regarding these abilities. 
 If we think more about this link between subjective experiences and objective 
events, intrasubjective spectrum inversion becomes even more unlikely. Before I turn to 
qualitative color-experience, I will talk about pain-experience. When we talk about pain-
experiences, it is very natural to assume that the feeling of pain affects our behavior in 
various ways. Imagine that a neurologist invents a machine that can stimulate our 
nervous system, in such a way that it will be in the same state as during the experience 
of breaking your finger. It is only natural that we would dislike the idea of this machine 
being used on us, even if the resulting experience would not be accompanied by actual 
physical harm. And our choice to avoid the nerve-stimulation experiment does not only 
suggest that qualitative experience is a relevant factor in our choices, it also shows that 
we assume we are able to predict what type of qualitative experience the experiment 
will cause: we assume that that experience will be similar to the unpleasant one we have 
during experiences that involve pain.   
Of course, a subjective report on one’s behavior does not imply that the 
qualitative experience of pain is indeed what causes us to avoid pain: perhaps a pain-
experience is something that merely happens to correlate with the type of events that 
can potentially harm a person, and it could be the case that the person is incorrect in 
their assessment that the predicted negative qualitative experience is a causal factor in 
their choice to avoid the neurologist’s machine. But if this is the case, our intuition tells 
us that there must still be a correlation between the actual causal factor and the 
qualitative sensation. The existence of this correlation is a requirement for our ability to 
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successfully predict what type of qualitative sensation we will have under certain 
circumstances. If we did not assume that this correlation exists, our aversion to the 
neurologist’s machine would not have a clear explanation. And if the link did not exist, it 
would not be clear why we would assume that it exists: if there was no link between 
certain events and the experience of pain, there would be no reason why we associate 
the experience of pain with certain events (like breaking a finger).  
Even though it seems that intrasubjective spectrum inversion goes against our 
intuitions regarding our ability to predict future qualitative experiences, a defender 
could find a place for it. We could argue that our intuitive assumption that we can 
successfully reflect on/predict things about qualitative experiences can still be justified, 
if we hold that intrasubjective spectrum inversion is conceivable but highly unlikely. 
Suppose that scientists determine that a person’s chance of undergoing sudden or 
gradual spectrum inversion at some point or during some period in their life is one in a 
billion: it would still be reasonable to expect that your qualitative color-experiences 
tomorrow will be similar to those today. The vast majority of people would be 
unaffected by it, and the potential of qualitative inversions would not affect their ability 
to predict tomorrow’s color-experiences. 
Now suppose that there are some unfortunate people for who the qualitative 
contents during certain experiences change very frequently: every day when they wake 
up, they find that the world around them seems to have different colors. When we wake 
them up and present them with a piece of colored paper (without any indications of 
what color it could be), they cannot give a convincing answer when we ask them what 
the color of the paper is called. They may know that the qualitative content of their 
current experience is similar to that of an experience that they had earlier, but their 
current experience lacks the representational content that would enable them to tell the 
color of the paper. Their qualitative experiences lack the type of consistency that is 
required for the ability of linking qualitative content to representational content. We 
would therefore be able to determine whether someone has undergone (or often 
undergoes) spectrum inversion by empirical tests such as the one with the piece of 
paper.  
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One could perhaps think that a combination of lacking abilities could mislead us 
into thinking that the person is capable of telling us the name  of the color of the paper. If 
a test-subject’s memory of color-perceptions shifts in harmony with their perception-
shifts, they may never notice anything weird going on. Their memory-shifts prevent the 
ability to successfully see the similarity between past/current/future color-experiences, 
while their lack of ability to have consistent color-perceptions prevents them from 
determining representational content (such as the names of colors). The combination of 
the lacking abilities goes unnoticed by both the test-person and by those who do the 
empirical testing. 
Does the scenario of lacking both consistent memories and consistent qualitative 
experiences actually make sense? It is not clear at all what exactly it is that supposedly 
changes, and how it affects their mind in any significant way. The internal aspects of the 
mind do not seem to differ in any significant way between the person whose memory 
and perception change in harmony and the person for who this change never occurs. 
They themselves will not notice anything, and their interaction with the external world 
does not change in any significant way: they are perfectly capable of pointing out the 
names of the colors of things around them. Since there seem to be no significant 
differences between the person with consistent memory and perception and the person 
with these supposed harmonized shifts, we may wonder whether the idea of a person 
with harmonized shifts even makes sense. Perhaps the idea that these shifting 
properties exist is a result of faulty theorizing: the assumption that they exist leads us to 
a problematic scenario, while rejection of the existence of these properties allows for a 
less complicated theory. And even if these properties do exist, they are not useful for 
those who wish to use inversion arguments: since the properties are not significant for 
the mind, the inability of a theory of mind to account for them is not a weakness of that 
theory. If the properties are not relevant for a description of the mind, a complete 
description of the mind can do without a description of these properties. 
Involving the ability hypothesis also enables us to show the implausibility of 
interpersonal spectrum inversion. If we hold that people have some kind of access to the 
qualitative content of their color-experience, and that there is a link between qualitative 
experience and behavior, then a significant intersubjective difference in qualitative 
color-experiences (during a specific event) would manifest itself in empirically testable 
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ways. This fits well with the characterization of qualitative experience (and its role in 
our behavior and perspective on the world) that the ability hypothesis gives us. Instead 
of empirically testing a single person’s relation to some color (like in the test with the 
colored paper), we could test whether multiple people have similar relations to some 
color. If we see that their behavior points toward similar abilities regarding the color, we 
could conclude that their color-experiences are similar. If we see significant differences 
in ability-related behavior (e.g. the ability to say the name of the color), we may be able 
to conclude that their color-experiences are different. 
Determining whether two subjects have similar/different color-experiences is 
not easy: there are various obstacles for successful empirical testing. Perhaps two 
subjects have always had similar color-experiences, but one of them has memory-
problems that cause him to think that his color-experiences change all the time. But even 
though the person may lack the ability to remember or predict experiences that are 
similar to his current one, we can still see the effects that it has on him at the moment. 
These effects may be subtle in the example of color, but more clear if we use other 
examples: a person in pain will likely show behavior aimed at avoiding whatever causes 
the pain. Moreover, the person will likely agree that their experience was one of pain at 
the moment, even though their later memory shift may lead them to think that it was 
not. may Here we see that even though a person may lack abilities regarding a certain 
qualitative experience, it is still possible to characterize their experience in terms of its 
causes and effects. 
The possibility to characterize experiences without involving abilities may seem 
like a problem for the ability hypothesis. But it is not problematic that an experience 
may be characterized in terms other than abilities, as the ability hypothesis only holds 
that the knowledge of experience is something that we can characterize in terms of 
abilities. That qualitative experiences sometimes occur without related abilities is not 
necessarily a problem, because abilities need not necessarily be involved. The ability 
hypothesis only relies on the intuition that qualitative experiences are things that we 
can have a grasp of through our abilities related to them, and that we often do so.  
While accepting the ability hypothesis (and its related implications regarding our 
acquaintance with qualitative experiences) may show that undetectable spectrum 
inversion is highly implausible, it does not show that it is inconceivable. But while the 
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ability hypothesis may therefore not give us a definitive way to reject inversion 
arguments, it does help us in building a plausible theory of mind that can account for the 
problematic role of qualitative experience. Acceptance of the ability hypothesis shows 
that spectrum inversion is not only highly implausible, but that the concept of spectrum 
inversion itself is suspect. If our abilities to recognize/remember/imagine qualitative 
experiences have been relatively successful up to this point, we can wonder how it could 
be that we would suddenly lose these abilities without detection by ourselves or by 
others. Having to account for the possibility of undetectable spectrum inversion would 
also require us to account for the possibility that our intuitions regarding our grip on 
qualitative experiences may be wrong, and those who use inversion arguments against 
functionalism would have to accept that unattractive requirement. 
The ability hypothesis and Inverted Earth 
If we analyze Block’s case of Inverted Earth with the ability hypothesis in mind, I think 
that there are three types of ability that are directly relevant. The first is the ability to 
recognize the qualitative content of your color-experiences. The second is the ability to 
correctly apply color-terms to the objects in your experience on the basis of color-
experiences. The third ability is the ability to apply color-terms to objects in the external 
world. 
 If you are (unknowingly) abducted to Inverted Earth and receive the inversion 
lenses, your ability to remember/recognize/imagine the qualitative content of color-
experiences is not affected. The qualitative content of your color-experience when 
looking at the sky on Inverted Earth is the same as on Earth: even though the color-
information of the objects on Inverted Earth is different than that of the corresponding 
objects on Earth, the inversion lenses make it so that the external color-information that 
reaches your perceptual apparatus is identical to that on Earth. You are correct when 
you say that you recognize the color-experience that you have while looking at the sky, 
as it is identical to the color-experience that you would have when you looked at the sky 
on Earth.  
 The potential issue comes in when we try to verify whether someone is able to 
correctly label the colors of things that they perceive. It may seem as if the abducted 
person is not, since their correct usage of color-terms may seem to be related to 
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properties of external objects: since they used to use the term “blue” in expressions 
related to the Earth-sky, we may be inclined to say that their term “blue” refers to the 
color of objects with the color of the Earth-sky (and the Inverted-Earth sky is not such 
an object). But if we hold that we are in some way able to sense similarities between 
qualitative experiences (which seems uncontroversial), we could also argue that their 
ability to correctly use color-terms is not reliant on the external world but on the link 
between their qualitative experience and the term that they apply to it. I will now 
explain this view further. 
 When we assess someone’s ability to correctly use a color-term, we could first 
look at the link between some color-experience and the term that they use to refer to it. 
If a subject consistently uses the three  terms “x”, “y”, “z” to respectively refer to the 
color of objects that give them color-experiences XQ, YQ and ZQ, then we can say that 
their usage of these terms refers to their corresponding color-experiences. Once we have 
established what terms they use, we can determine their ability to name colors by 
determining whether they use the names “x”, “y”, “z” when they are presented with 
objects that respectively give them color-experiences XQ, YQ, and ZQ. 
 If we assess a subject’s ability to name colors with the proposed method, their 
ability to name colors on Inverted Earth will be the same as it was on Earth. If they say 
that “the sky is blue” while on Inverted Earth, they are correct: if “the sky is blue” used to 
mean that the sky was such that looking at it gave them a color-experience of blue, and 
the sky on Inverted Earth has the same effect (which is true, because of the inversion 
lenses), then they are right in calling the sky blue.  We must remember that when they 
say “the sky” on Inverted Earth, we could say that this refers to [Inverted Earth-sky as 
seen through inversion lenses]. And since their perception of [Inverted Earth-sky as 
seen through inversion lenses] is identical to their perception of [Earth-sky without 
inversion lenses], they are correct when they use the same color-term for both. Under 
this interpretation of correct color-term usage, bringing a person to Inverted Earth does 
not change the functional buildup of their ability to name colors of objects as they 
perceive them. 
 There may seem to be something unnatural about my proposed method. It seems 
that when we say something like “the sky is blue”, we are not merely talking about a 
property of our perception of the sky: a big part of it seems to be a claim about 
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properties of the actual sky in the external world. I agree that this is a big part of the 
statement, but I think that we could characterize description of this aspect as a separate 
ability: the ability to correctly refer to external objects. This way we can still say that 
people keep their ability to name colors during the whole process of [correctly naming 
colors on Normal Earth]->[incorrectly naming colors on Inverted Earth]->[correctly 
naming colors on Inverted Earth], while we also agree that there is a functional change 
regarding the relation between the subject and the external world. 
 I agree that the specific ability to correctly name things in the external world is 
where attempts at functional description may encounter a problem: while I have argued 
that the subject’s ability to name the colors of perceived objects remains intact during 
the Inverted Earth-scenario, there does seem to be a change in their ability to assess 
properties of the external world. But the question is whether the inability to correctly 
name colors in the external world is something that is very problematic for a theory of 
mind. This question can be put as follows: is a functional change in the ability to 
correctly name colors of objects in the external world problematic for a description of 
the relevant aspects of a subject’s mental states? I think that the answer is no. The main 
reason for this is that neither the behavior nor the qualitative aspects of the test-
person’s experience are affected. their mental state is not affected in any way that is 
relevant for the test-person themselves: they have no idea what they have undergone, 
and their behavior has not changed in any way. And during the whole process of 
[correctly naming colors on Normal Earth]->[incorrectly naming colors on Inverted 
Earth]->[correctly naming colors on Inverted Earth], neither their ability to recognize 
similar experiences nor the ability to name the colors in those experiences was affected 
by the move to Inverted Earth.  
The conclusion of this part of the paper is that if we analyze qualitative 
experience in terms of abilities, inversion arguments do not pose a significant problem 
to analytic functionalism. The analysis of intrasubjective spectrum inversion shows that 
a sudden shift in color-experiences does not directly affect the ability to recognize 
similar experiences, and that any difficulties that would arise from this shift (e.g. lack of 
ability to correctly name colors) would be detectable in behavior. This also holds for 
intersubjective spectrum inversion, if we use empirical tests that can show the 
differences in the abilities of different people. Analytic functionalists who accept the 
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ability hypothesis are free to acknowledge that the Inverted Earth-scenario shows that 
some properties of behavior (e.g. transition in the correctness of using color-terms to 
refer to external objects) are not properly accounted for, because they can say that these 
properties are not relevant for a complete theory of mind: if we characterize qualitative 
experience in terms of abilities, a change in color-terms that are applied to external 
objects is not directly relevant. If the ability hypothesis works, we have a strong tool 
against inversion arguments. It would be valuable to have further independent 
arguments for the plausibility of the ability hypothesis, and therefore I will present some 
of these in the next part. 
 
 
Part IV 
The Plausibility of the Ability Hypothesis 
 
In this part, I will attempt to show why a combination of analytic functionalism and the 
ability hypothesis can work as the basis for a plausible and complete theory of mind. 
This part consists of two smaller parts. In the first smaller part, I will reflect on the 
problematic intuitions regarding qualitative experience that underlie many arguments 
against analytic functionalism. I will then argue that AF+AH works with a 
characterization of qualitative experience that is less problematic.  In the second smaller 
part, I will attempt to give a plausible explanation for the fact that qualitative experience 
seems so hard to characterize in a theory. I will use texts by Shoemaker, Quine and 
Dennett to form a potential picture of why it is that we have qualitative experiences, and 
why they may sometimes seem to evade successful formal description. I will also show 
how AF+AH fits well with this picture, and that even though analytic functionalism may 
seem unintuitive in some parts, this is not a reason for rejecting it. 
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Problems in the traditional view on qualia 
In ‘Quining Qualia’(1993), Dennett wants to show that the traditional notion of qualia 
that is often appealed to is fundamentally flawed, and that an attempt to improve this 
notion disarms many arguments that rely on it.149 He presents and attacks fifteen 
intuitions that often underlie the problematic notion of qualia, and I will now reflect on 
some of his strongest points. 
The first intuition that he focuses on is one that I have already covered earlier: 
the intuition that intersubjective and intrasubjective shifts in qualitative experience are 
possible.150 Dennett says that the big mistake in this intuition is the thought that qualia 
can be isolated from everything else in experience.151 But the fault in this idea is not only 
the thought that we are capable of performing this isolation: the fundamental mistake is 
in the thought that there would even be such an isolated qualitative property at all.152 
Dennett thinks that there are no such properties: we cannot isolate the qualitative 
smell/taste/sound that an individual experiences from the experience, as there is no 
such isolated thing.153 
Another often-held intuition regarding qualia is that we have infallible access to 
them: it may seem as if having some qualitative experience gives us authoritative access 
to properties of that qualitative experience. To show that we do not have infallible 
access to our supposed qualitative experiences, Dennett introduces an example of two  
experienced coffee tasters whose job at a coffee factory is to ensure that the taste of the 
coffee remains constant. One of them (Chase) says that he has lost his appreciation for 
the taste of the coffee: he thinks that the taste of the coffee has remained constant over 
the years, but that his own preference for tastes has changed.154 The other taster 
(Sanborn) is in a different situation: he has also lost his appreciation for the coffee, but 
he thinks it is because his taste-buds or some other part in his perceptual machinery has 
somehow changed. He is convinced that he still has the same preference for tastes, but 
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that his sense of taste has changed so that he can no longer experience them like he did 
before.155 
We could accept that Chase and Sanborn are infallible about their qualitative 
experience, and that they are both right in their assessments. But there are alternative 
explanations for the changes in their experiences:156 Chase might be mistaken about his 
change in taste preference, and his qualia may have slowly shifted over the years. And 
Sanborn’s standard may have shifted over the years: he thinks that his earlier 
experiences with the coffee were better, because nostalgia has tinted his memory. It is 
also possible that both of them are partly right in their assessments, while they are also 
partly affected by the alternatives.157 It seems that these alternative options could just as 
well be what is going on, and we have no clear reason to think that Chase and Sanborn 
are right in their assessments.  
In order to make a reliable statement about the properties of our experience, 
Dennett thinks that we should regard our self-reports as judgments: “a subject’s 
experience has the quale F if and only if the subject judges his experience to have quale 
F.”158 The quale is then introduced through the judgment of the subject.159 If we regard 
self-reports regarding qualitative reports as judgments, qualia should be regarded as 
mere theoretical constructs.160 We could think of empirical tests that would show 
whether Chase and Sanborn are right in their assessments (such as blind tastings).161 
The results of these test could support or oppose their claims, and give us some insight 
in whether they indeed have infallible access to their qualitative experience.162  
There are complications for the evaluation of claims regarding qualia. We can 
imagine a surgery where the connections of a person’s taste buds are shifted, so that 
things now taste different for that person.163 It is possible that other parts of the 
person’s perceptual system that come before the judgment regarding qualia already 
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compensate for the shift in the taste buds.164 This would mean that the qualia remain the 
same, as the physiological facts still result in the same input for the part of the process 
where qualia are introduced. But it could also be the case that compensation takes place 
after the part where the qualia is introduced.165 The person may think that lemons taste 
as sour as ever (even though his taste buds now produce output that would previously 
have been processed as sweet), because his memories and language regarding the taste 
of lemons have compensated for the new taste. In the latter case the supposed quale 
involved in tasting sour things has changed, even though the person thinks that it is still 
the same.166 
The two possible cases presented above show that attempts to evaluate claims 
about qualia based on empirical methods can be complicated. The subject himself 
cannot settle which of the two options is applicable to his situation, as he has no faculties 
to determine whether it are his memories or his qualia that are different.167A scientist 
can come to both conclusions, as their conclusion is determined by how they have 
chosen to exactly define which properties of the cognitive process are qualia.168 The 
scientist could choose to say that the qualia have changed after the surgery (and that the 
subjects conviction that they are still the same must be the result of memory-
compensation), or that compensation has taken place before the step in the process 
where the qualia are judged (meaning that the subject is right in his judgment that his 
qualia have remained the same).169 Due to the fact that the subject cannot justify his 
conviction that one of these is the right answer, the scientist is free to choose their own 
conception of qualia that fits one of these conclusions.170 
Dennett sees a problem in the traditional idea that experiences give us access to 
some sort of intrinsic property of something (like an intrinsic taste or smell). He gives an 
example to show that even when things may seem intrinsic, careful analysis can often 
show that they are relational.171 An experienced beer drinker may say that beer is an 
acquired taste: most people do not enjoy their first sip of beer, and if every subsequent 
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sip would taste similar to the first one, no one would keep drinking beer.172 This 
statement seems plausible, and it presents a big problem for defenders of traditional 
qualia. The taste of the first sip may have seemed to produce acquaintance with some 
sort of ‘intrinsic taste of beer’, but the fact that one’s appreciation for beer can change 
during later tastings means that the ‘intrinsic qualities’ of our beer-drinking experience 
are actually relational properties: the experience depends on both independent 
properties of the beer itself and on your taste-perception of these properties.173  
The ability hypothesis versus Dennett 
I think that Dennett’s points are no problem for the ability hypothesis, and that we can 
accept the ability hypothesis while we also accept Dennett’s perspective on qualitative 
experience. I will now reflect on three issues that Dennett’s view may seem to present 
for the ability hypothesis, and I will explain why I think that they are not actually very 
problematic. 
The first potential issue is Dennett´s claim that we cannot isolate some sort of 
qualitative aspect of experiences. We can accept both this claim and the ability 
hypothesis, as the ability hypothesis does not necessarily hold that there is some 
isolated qualitative aspect of experience. When we say that we are able to 
remember/recognize/imagine some experience, we do indeed suggest that we are 
acquainted with some sort of qualitative aspect. But we do not need to hold that this 
aspect is some fine-grained isolable thing, as our recognition of experiences may not 
require such a fine-grained access to some supposed quale. When we claim that we are 
acquainted with the experience of seeing blue, we do not have to hold that there is some 
special specific attribute of seeing-blue-experiences that we are acquainted with. We 
only need to have a somewhat clear idea of what we experience when we are confronted 
with blue, and under what circumstances this experiences would come about. We would 
also need to be able to in some way imagine what effect the involvement of blue-
experience would have on our general experience at some moment. But we would not 
need to be acquainted with some specific type of isolable quality of blue-experiences 
that supposedly make these experiences into blue-experiences. 
                                                          
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
44 
 
 The second issue that Dennett addresses is our fallibility in our reflection on our 
qualitative experiences. Examples such as that of Chase and Sanborn may seem to 
suggest that our ability to recognize/imagine/remember experiences may not be 
reliable. But this problem can be softened by noting that the ability hypothesis does not 
directly make claims about our success in recognizing/imagining/remembering all types 
of experiences. Perhaps our ability to accurately recognize similar (or dissimilar) taste-
experiences over time is simply not good enough, but that does not mean that we do not 
have the ability to roughly imagine/recognize/remember many other things. 
 My point becomes more clear when we look at the example of coffee-tasting. 
When we say that our current experience while drinking coffee (after drinking the exact 
same type of coffee for years) is different than it was years ago, we do not need to make 
any claims about why it is that it is different. We could simply say that we do not 
recognize the current experience as an experience that we have had before, regardless 
of whether we actually did have the experience earlier or not. It is irrelevant whether it 
is our taste-preference that changed, or our perceptual apparatus, or some combination 
of both. We may have the rough ability to recognize that it is the same coffee that we are 
drinking, while lacking the ability to imagine exactly what it was like when we drank the 
coffee years ago. And this is fine: upon reflection, many people will acknowledge that 
their acquaintance with the exact experience that they had while tasting coffee years ago 
is not very accurate or reliable.  
 A potential problem comes from the fact that we have to account for memories 
that are blatantly false. Suppose that you drank some type of coffee many years ago, and 
hated the taste. Now you drink it again, and love the taste. Your memory of the last time 
you drank it may be flawed, and you may think that your positive experience with the 
taste at the moment is just like the experience you had back then. How should we 
account for this type of fallibility? I think that analytic functionalism can be helpful here, 
as functional analysis of both experiences can show us why we are mistaken and why 
our perspective on the experiences is not infallible. Suppose that years ago, your 
behavior while you drank the coffee was carefully documented. You were asked various 
question to find out what you really thought about the coffee, and this (alongside with 
further behavioral analysis) was used to determine that your experience was very 
negative. When you are now confronted with the results of this analysis, you may be 
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shocked to find out that the situation was very different from how you remember it. But 
would you reject the analysis? It seems reasonable to say that many people would be 
prepared to reject their memory and acknowledge that their previous experience was 
not as they thought. And even if they would not do so, we could reject their claim about 
their memory ourselves. 
 The third relevant issue that Dennett notes is that we often do not become 
acquainted with intrinsic properties of things. This issue is not a problem for the ability 
hypothesis: our ability to recognize/remember/imagine does not rely on access to 
supposed intrinsic properties of things. When we say that a current experience is similar 
to an earlier experience, we simply say that something about the experiences (whatever 
it may exactly be) is similar enough that it warrants the claim that they are alike. 
Whether the properties that we access in our experiences are intrinsic or relational is 
not relevant, as long as we can recognize that experiences are similar or dissimilar. 
 It seems safe to conclude that the notion of qualitative experience used for the 
ability hypothesis is not affected by the problems that Dennett describes. While the 
ability hypothesis is an attempt to find a characterization for our acquaintance with 
qualitative experience, it does not involve the problematic notion of qualia that Dennett 
attacks. The claim that we are able to recognize/imagine/remember qualitative 
experiences does not say much about the exact character of these experiences, and it 
does not involve infallible access or commitment to acquaintance with intrinsic qualities. 
It only requires acceptance of the (relatively broad) idea that there are certain 
similarities between qualitative experiences, and that we can often be aware of these 
similarities in some way.  
Some useful reflections on similarity 
In order to further defend the plausibility of the ability hypothesis, I will first present 
some viewpoints regarding the concept of similarity of experiences. Similarity (and 
dissimilarity) play a fundamental role in evolutionary processes: an organism’s chance 
to survive is dependent on its ability to behave in a way that suits its environment, and 
this requires the ability to recognize whether some object or process in its environment 
is similar to the objects or processes that are either positive (e.g. food, shelter) or 
negative (e.g. predators) for the organism. To show why the concepts of similarity and 
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ability play a role both on a relatively simple level (like in the case of insects that search 
for food) and on a more complex level (like in our conscious reflection on experience), I 
will now present the viewpoints of Quine (1969) and Shoemaker (1975) on the role of 
similarity. After that, I will reflect on Dennett’s (2017) perspective on our ability to be 
aware of similarities. I think that a combination of these three views will give us a 
plausible characterization of our experience and (in)abilities (including our inability to 
always successfully convey experiences through description), that fits well with analytic 
functionalism and the ability hypothesis. 
Awareness of similarities  
In ‘Phenomenal Similarity’(1975), Shoemaker attempts to provide an explanation of 
what qualitative similarities are and how we should analyze them. The idea that we have 
immediate intuitive awareness of the similarity and differences between our 
phenomenal states comes with a problem: how are we able to see similarity,  and how 
can we know that some qualities are similar to others? Shoemaker refers to Quine’s 
description of ‘innate quality spaces’ as a start for the solution of this problem.  
A response to a red circle, if it is rewarded, will be elicited again by a pink 
ellipse more readily than by a blue triangle; the red circle resembles the pink 
ellipse more than the blue triangle. Without some such prior spacings of 
qualities, we could never acquire a habit; all stimuli would be equally alike and 
equally different. These spacings of qualities, on the part of men and other 
animals, can be explored and mapped in the laboratory by experiments in 
conditioning and extinction. Needed as they are for all learning, these 
distinctive spacings cannot themselves all be learned; some must be innate. 
(Quine, 1969: 123) 
 
While Shoemaker presumes that Quine would use behavioral terms to judge the 
accordance between a creature’s innate quality spaces and relevant groupings in nature, 
Shoemaker himself will provide an account with mentalistic terms.174 A proper innate 
spacing can then be described as follows: if a creature has the proper spacing for 
relations of similarity (or difference) between things, then that means that its perceptual 
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experiences of similarity between things corresponds to actual similarities between 
those things.175  
It may seem odd  that the subjective quality spaces that we use to group similar 
things together is so harmonious with the relevant groupings in nature, but Shoemaker 
follows Quine in saying that this is the result of natural selection.176 Creatures that lack 
the ability to make inductions that accord with the relevant groupings in nature are less 
likely to survive. They are unable to process their environment in a way that favors their 
survival, while there are other creatures that are able to do this processing. This means 
that natural selection favors the latter group of creatures, as they are better suited to 
live in their environment and have a better chance of creating offspring.177 
The reason for our awareness of similarities 
While Shoemaker reflects on our ability to be aware of similarities between perceptual 
experiences, he does not give a clear reason for why we are consciously aware of them. 
The explanation for awareness of similarities between sensory experiences seemed very 
plausible: any organism without this ability would go extinct. But this reason does not 
extend to awareness of perceptual similarity: we can safely say that many organisms do 
not have this type of awareness, yet are still able to survive as a species. This raises the 
question of why humans do have this ability, for which Dennett provides a possible 
answer. 
 One of the topics that Dennett addresses in From Bacteria to Bach and Back 
(2017) is the role of our ‘sense of self’. Our sense of self seems to have developed for the 
process of communication: in order to successfully communicate relatively complicated 
things, we need to see ourselves as a subject just like how we see others.178 Because our 
communication is more complex than the primitive forms of communication found in 
other animals, our sense of self is also more complex than that of other animals.179 Not 
only do we have to keep track of which objects are part of our own body (just like simple 
organisms), we also have to monitor our awareness of certain pieces of information and 
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process whether we want to communicate this information in any way.180 Dennett 
defines our stream of consciousness as an ‘edited digest’ of  activities in our brain, 
available because of its role in communicating our thoughts (in the broadest sense) to 
others and ourselves.181 
 Dennett’s view on consciousness fits well as an answer to the question of why we 
are aware of the similarities between perceptions. While simple organisms only require 
the ability to determine sensory similarities in the relevant basic quality spaces (e.g. 
colors, smells), humans have evolved in a way that makes communication a very 
important aspect of life. For communication, the ability to recognize similar sensory 
experiences is not enough in itself: we also need to be able to process and interpret this 
similarity in a way that enables us to convey it to others or ourselves.  
 Dennett notes that our access to our thinking and the processes involved in it is 
not categorically different or better than our access to other bodily processes (such as 
our digestive system).182 While awareness of similar experiences may only take place in 
more complex organisms, the awareness itself is not necessarily a more complex 
process. Dennett’s notion of ‘local competences’ refers to relatively simple brain 
activities, while ‘global comprehension’ refers to more complex activities such as the 
ability to communicate things, or to plan ahead, or to imagine a variety of potential 
future situations.183 If we follow Dennett in his view that consciousness is the result of a 
complex structure made out of local competences184, we can say that awareness of 
similar experiences is the result of the structure, while other types of awareness (like 
the basic awareness of similar colors) have different roles.  
 It is possible to describe our awareness of similar experiences with the help of 
Quine’s notion of quality spaces.  While simple organisms only have a limited range of 
relevant quality spaces (e.g. colors or shapes), effective communication requires us to be 
able to determine which of our perceptions are relevant in communication. We could say 
that besides the sensory quality spaces, there are also quality spaces for communication. 
But instead of being related to the relevant basic groupings in nature, these quality 
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spaces are related to the relevant social groupings. The ability of simple organisms to be 
aware of the right sensory quality spaces is needed for their survival in nature, while our 
ability to be aware of the right perceptual quality spaces is needed for a successful life in 
a social context. Since the ability to successfully communicate (whether it is to 
cooperate, deceive, or in some other context) gives an advantage over others that lack 
this ability, it is plausible that the process of natural selection has favored those with the 
best communicative abilities.  
AF+AH in the context of Quine, Shoemaker and Dennett 
While it seems to be possible to find a place for qualitative experience in an evolutionary 
account of  the mental, the connection between qualitative experience and evolution is 
not directly clear. We must still explain why we have evolved to have some sort of rough 
conscious access to qualitative experiences (either through direct exposure or through 
introspection/remembering), and why at the same time there are aspects of these 
experiences that we cannot effectively describe. 
When we see our cognitive abilities as the result of evolutionary processes, it 
becomes clear why it is hard to describe some aspects of experience.  Since successful 
species adapt to their environment, it is to be expected that our higher cognitive 
functions are also fine-tuned in terms of value for our survival. While our abilities such 
as abstract thinking and communication may allow for reflections that are not directly 
beneficial to our survival (like reflection on qualitative experience), it is only to be 
expected that they do not always provide success in those cases. And I think that if we 
take a further look at our capabilities to reflect on things and communicate them, it will 
become clear that the limited success of our ability to communicate about experiences is 
based on the limited role of this communication in survival.  
Consider the example of communication related to color. When we are 
confronted with a yellow object, this confrontation can  affect us in all sorts of ways. We 
may recognize the color and think of other things that have the color. Through 
introspection, we may focus on the color itself.  The experience may invoke all sorts of 
other thoughts and mental processes that affect us in many ways, both consciously and 
unconsciously. But when we communicate to others about color, we can only do so in 
functionally definable terms: “there is a yellow object behind this wall”, “yellow is the 
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color of bananas and the sun”, “I like the color yellow”, “an eye-condition prevents me 
from distinguishing yellow and orange”, etcetera. We can only communicate our relation 
to the color yellow by saying things about the effect that the color has on us, and usually 
only in relatively vague terms.  
Our inability to clearly communicate the complete functional role that 
experiences have for us also works the other way around: we cannot learn the full effect 
of an experience on our mental state by being told about it. If another person tells us 
about their thrilling experience of riding a rollercoaster, we can only understand them 
insofar as we are able to relate the tale to our own experiences. Many intense 
experiences affect us in various ways, and it is clearly wrong to assume that this whole 
process could be communicated. But it would be a mistake to use this incommunicability 
as an argument for the existence of some type of ‘phenomenal information’, as we have 
seen earlier that this notion is very problematic in itself. There seems to be no clear 
advantage in having the ability to communicate what it is like to see some color, so it is 
not weird that we have not evolved to be able to do so. And while this inability to 
communicate some aspect of experiences may lead to a type of mystery regarding 
qualitative experience, it seems wrong to take this mystery as a reason for accepting that 
there must be some kind of phenomenal aspect to the world. 
We are now at a point where we can look at inversion arguments from a 
functionalist perspective again. If we look at color-perception from a functional 
perspective, undetectable color-inversion is implausible. If our conscious experience is 
based on all the local parts of our brain working together to effectively live in our 
environment, the introduction of some phenomenal extra layer on top of our functional 
buildup is unnecessary: our ability to reflect and report on experiences is all that we 
need to account for, and the limits of these abilities are no reason to introduce 
phenomenal qualities.  
 It is, of course, not the case that our mind should necessarily have the most 
simple structure. It is conceivable that there are qualitative phenomena that somehow 
occur alongside our physical/functional processes (like the nomological danglers that 
Smart spoke of).  Jackson (1982) argues that even though qualia may not be conducive 
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to survival, they can be a byproduct of traits that are conducive to survival.185 But while 
an appeal to parsimony may not be the ideal reason for accepting functionalism, it may 
be possible to show just how very unlikely it would be that there is some phenomenal 
layer of experience.  
In a certain sense, sensory information ‘seeps’ through our cognitive systems: if 
we were to confront a test subject in a controlled environment with a blue mug, the 
brain-processes that start would be considerably different from the processes that 
would have started from confrontation with a yellow mug. This may not directly show in 
external behavior, and it is up to scientists to show the extent of the differences in the 
brain-processes. But it is clear that slight variations in the external environment can lead 
to very complex differences between inner processes, and it would be bizarre to think 
that our personal experience gives us better authority to speak about these differences.  
 Our brain is so complex that we cannot easily, if at all, grasp how it works. We 
may be able to create complete theories to describe the brain, but a single person will 
not be able to fully comprehend what is going on in their brain at a certain time. If we 
describe the brain through scientific theories, we can find all sorts of intricate functions 
and structures. We could find how various degrees of pain affect behavior, and how 
confrontations with different pieces of color-information start different processes in the 
brain. It is clear that the resultant body of knowledge will be vast and complex, and it 
may sometimes lead to descriptions of experience that do not seem to fit with some 
intuitions regarding experience. But instead of thinking that there is some phenomenal 
aspect to the world that cannot be grasped in functionalist terms, it seems more 
appropriate to think that our functional buildup is so complex that we cannot fully grasp 
how it leads to qualitative experience. 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to defend the thesis that analytic functionalism provides an 
appropriate framework for a plausible and complete analysis of mental states. To do this, I 
have tried to show that a functionalist approach is the most plausible approach to the 
analysis of mental states. Many philosophers would agree that some degree of functional 
analysis is useful in the description of mental states, but most discussion revolves 
around the question whether a functional analysis can provide a complete description of 
mental states. I agree that there are many intuitive reasons to doubt this, but that 
thorough reflection on the way that we approach mental states shows that functional 
analysis can provide a complete description of mental states. 
A definitive proof of Lewis’s view that mental states are necessarily identical with 
physical states would be the most convincing argument for this view, but I have not been 
able to create such a proof. Instead, I have argued in favor of analytic functionalism in 
three steps. The first step was to show how accepting the ability hypothesis would allow 
us to see the implausibility of inversion arguments, thereby refuting a main argument 
against analytic functionalism. The second step was showing that the characterization of 
qualitative experiences used in the ability hypothesis is able to withstand many 
arguments against the traditional conception of qualia. The third step was showing that 
the combination of AF+AH fits well in a evolutionary account of the mind, and that it is to 
be expected that some aspects of qualitative experience cannot be fully grasped based 
on theoretical descriptions. 
I think that the combination of analytic functionalism and the ability hypothesis 
gives us a strong basis to argue against the plausibility of inversion arguments. Analytic 
functionalism by itself gives us an effective way to characterize many parts of the mind, 
albeit in a way that may leave open some doubts about qualitative properties. By 
introducing the ability hypothesis, it becomes possible to bridge the gap between the 
purely functional and the qualitative aspects of experience. The ability hypothesis gives 
us a way to characterize the qualitative aspects of experiences in a way that fits well 
with many of our intuitions, without falling prey to the problematic notion of qualia that 
is required for classic inversion arguments. Block’s example of Inverted Earth may show 
that there is something related to the mind that is not captured by AF+AH (potential 
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transitions in the correct reference to the colors of things in the external world), but I 
think that this weakness is not a significant problem for a theory of mind. I think it is 
safe to conclude that the combination of AF and AH is plausible enough that defenders of 
inversion arguments should doubt whether they are prepared to uphold the intuitions 
that underlie their view. 
When we consider the problems in alternative positions and the fact that 
functionalism can be defended against many of the main doubts, I think that we can 
conclude that analytic functionalism can indeed provide a plausible and reliable analysis 
of mental states. But I think that there is another strength of functional analysis that 
deserves a brief mention. It is clear that there is a significant gap between the folk-
psychological way of understanding the mind on one side, and the scientific way on the 
other. While the last 100 years are filled with scientific developments regarding the 
brain, these developments do not always translate well into folk-psychological notions.  
In order to bridge the gap, it is helpful to have a theory that puts folk-psychological 
concepts into a scientific perspective. I think that analytic functionalism is a useful 
theory in this regard, as it allows for a practical theory of mind that is supported by 
science. 
One could argue that the folk-psychological influences in analytic philosophy are 
a weakness, and that our common-sense notions about the mind should be rejected in 
favor  of a purely scientific theory. There is some logic behind the eliminativist view: 
since our common-sense view on the mind is bound to contain some flaws, a purely 
scientific view would surely be more reliable. But the complete rejection of common-
sense notions is problematic: if the scientific theory is too far removed from our 
practical understanding of our mind, we can doubt whether it is suitable for answering 
the questions about the mind that we are interested in. Scientific findings can help to 
correct mistakes that we make in our everyday assessments regarding our own mind 
and the minds of others, and we should always pursue a fuller understanding of the 
mind by scientific means. But we have to account for our inability to effectively use a 
complex and unintuitive scientific theory. A theory that bridges the gap between science 
and common sense is a valuable compromise, and I think that analytic functionalism (in 
combination with the ability hypothesis) is suitable for this purpose. 
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While analytic functionalism is useful, it is not perfect. I think that I have found a 
reasonable explanation for the supposed elusiveness of qualitative properties, but this 
may not be convincing to everyone. I think that my explanation is plausible and not as 
problematic as alternatives, but there is still room for doubt. A possible reason for this 
doubt could be that our supposed access to qualitative properties seems very natural 
and intuitive, while rejection of this supposed access involves a lot of reasoning. But 
while this may be the case, I think that it is still possible to convince others of the 
plausibility of analytic functionalism. It is unlikely that a single paper will lead to sudden 
rejection of deeply-rooted intuitions regarding the mind, but it may be possible to stir 
some doubts in some people. And if this paper helps anyone to become more 
sympathetic towards analytic functionalism, then it will have served a valuable purpose. 
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